In my comprehensive post on January 2 on this blog, I had stated—among other issues—that the return of BNP to power through the February 12 elections was a foregone conclusion. The appointment of Tarique Rahman as Prime Minister of Bangladesh was equally predictable.
The entire script was transparent. Awami League—the largest
political party that spearheaded Bangladesh’s liberation and sought to reshape
the country’s identity through linguistic and cultural nationalism rather than
anti-India Islamic nationalism—was banned and effectively expelled from the
electoral process. The space for any alternative outcome was virtually
non-existent.
India’s Prime Minister has congratulated Tarique Rahman on
Platform X (formerly Twitter) on his electoral victory and expressed support
for his efforts to fulfil the aspirations of the Bangladeshi people. Media
reports indicate that Tarique has invited all SAARC leaders, including the
Indian Prime Minister for his swearing in ceremony.
New Delhi has no other option but to engage whoever is in
power in Dhaka. However, it would be naïve to expect the same degree of warmth
and cooperation from a BNP regime as was available during Sheikh Hasina’s
tenure—despite her occasional deviations, including outreach to Islamists and
China that unsettled Indian policymakers.
I had previously discussed the background and support base
of BNP. Given its ideological positioning and constituency, it would be
difficult for Tarique Rahman to replicate the collaborative tone that defined
India-Bangladesh ties under Hasina.
Possible Areas of Optimism
Unlike Jamaat, Tarique Rahman is not viewed as radical. Many
analysts suggest that once Awami League is removed from Bangladesh’s political
space, contradictions between BNP and Jamaat may intensify.
BNP may also attempt to occupy the political space vacated
by Awami League, potentially nudging it toward a relatively conciliatory
approach. As a pragmatic politician, Tarique is unlikely to overtly antagonize
a large and powerful neighbor. These dynamics provide limited but real grounds
for cautious optimism regarding a more calculated and pragmatic engagement with
India.
On the BNP–Jamaat–Pakistan–Taliban Comparison
Some members of India’s strategic community draw parallels
between a possible BNP–Jamaat fallout and the rift between Pakistan’s military
establishment and the Taliban.
Pakistan’s military—despite being significantly
Westernized—created and relied upon the Taliban to shape the Af-Pak region.
Over time, however, shifting contexts produced friction and divergence.
Yet the comparison with Bangladesh is flawed. BNP is not a
military establishment, and Jamaat is an older political entity than BNP, sharing
the same domestic political space. Since the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, BNP
and Jamaat have often operated in a symbiotic tango.
Bangladesh’s internal political soil and its
geopolitical-security equilibrium make the situation far more complex than a
simple replication of the Pakistan–Taliban trajectory.
In 2021, following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, I
assessed that:
- The
Taliban of 2021 differed significantly from 2001 but its core ideological
outlook of Islamic radicalism and conservatism had remained intact.
- Its
return would energize Islamist radicalism regionally and beyond albeit in
a more refined form.
- Splintering
within Islamist groups would continue.
- Despite
apparent bonhomie at that moment, tensions between Pak military and the
Taliban were inevitable.
Those assessments were rooted in internal character and
divergent expectations of both Pak ISI and Taliban. Bangladesh’s context,
however, requires a deeper examination of domestic complexities and the broader
geopolitical environment.
Structural Complexities Within Bangladesh
BNP’s support base—including links with sections of the
military establishment—makes it difficult for the party to entirely shed its
anti-India orientation.
Competition between BNP and Jamaat—despite their cooperation
during elections—will likely intensify as both seek to expand their political ideological
and organisational support base. While Jamaat promotes a hardline Islamic
vision, BNP has historically articulated a softer form of Islamic nationalism.
Yet both share different strands of anti-India and anti-Hindu sentiment. It
must be remembered that BNP’s ideological framework promotes a distinct Bengali
Islamic nationalism in contrast to Awami League’s secular-cultural Bengali
nationalism.
Sheikh Mujib and Awami League had attempted to dismantle the
subcontinental psychological divide framed in religious terms and link
Bangladesh’s destiny to regional economic advancement through cooperation with
India. Their outlook was shaped by their personal traumatic experiences under
Pakistani military rule and resistance to Islamic radicalism.
Hasina’s tenure, however, was not without contradictions.
While she resisted radicalism, her creation of Qaumi Madrassas reflected
strategic compromises. At the same time, India’s limited and inconsistent
response to radicalism, China’s growing influence, India’s inability to curb
Pakistanism effectively, and the rise of Hindu parochialism in India
collectively weakened the broader cultural-nationalistic architecture of Bangladesh.
BNP, in contrast, advances a narrative of distinct Bengali
Islamic nationalism that often perceives itself in ideological tension with
India. Even if not overtly hostile like Jamaat, its ideological framework
fosters adversarial undercurrents. Symbolic controversies—such as cricket
disputes or fringe religious provocations—can easily inflame sentiment.
Geopolitical Shifts and External Actors
The broader geopolitical environment has turned unfavorable
for Bangladesh’s cultural nationalists and for India. Responsibility lies
partly with leadership failures on both sides.
Both Western powers and China appear willing to support a
regime in Dhaka that maintains a more adversarial equation with India.
Sheikh Hasina’s Govt, despite all allegations was a lawful
regime that was replaced by an unelected and illegitimate dispensation with
support of radicals. For one and half years, an unelected caretaker dispensation
presided over serious and sustained killing of minorities and targeted Awami
League workers as well. Sadly, India’s concerns appeared limited to minority
protection rather than a comprehensive support to Bengali cultural and secular nationalism.
China, unconcerned with electoral legitimacy, has always pursued
strategic influence in almost every quarter of the world. Surprisingly, much of
the Western world has also endorsed the Feb 12 elections despite reported
irregularities, expulsion of the largest political party and turnout below 47%.
In this context, the announcement of zero percent tariffs
for Bangladeshi textiles in the United States signals significant Western
backing for the post-Awami political order.
China’s strategic posture is particularly significant. It
engages multiple factions within states without attempting to alter internal
balances overtly. This enables it to secure long-term strategic and economic
interests—even amid instability. Its engagement across Myanmar, Africa, Central
Asia, and Sri Lanka demonstrates this capacity.
A BNP government may seek economic benefits from India while
simultaneously leveraging alternative alignments with China and the West. Overt
diplomacy may coexist with indirect pressure tactics in NE region and Bengal in
collusion with Pakistan ISI.
Internal Strategic Outlook in Bangladesh
Many Bangladeshi intellectuals and securocrats argue that
separation from Pakistan is settled history. In their view, Pakistan no longer
poses a direct threat, while India—as the larger neighbor—does.
This perception has historically shaped policy, including
support for anti-India insurgents and demographic shifts in border regions
through large-scale state supported migration into India. Meanwhile, India’s
domestic discourse remains focused largely on illegal migration without a
deeper strategic framework to address the issue.
While Pakistan lacks the economic capacity to assist
Bangladesh significantly, China and the West provide alternatives.
Strategically, Dhaka under BNP appears more likely to permit use of its
territory for actions detrimental to Indian security interests.
These dynamics will test India’s strategic imagination.
National security cannot rely on diplomacy alone; it depends on economic
strength, technological competitiveness, institutional coherence, and societal
resilience, which have been reduced to near irrelevance in India’s political
discourse.
Larger Principles of Statecraft
I have previously advocated the concept of Indocracy—a
fusion of ancient Indian statecraft traditions with modern Western principles
of accountable, law-based governance.
One major weakness in many Afro-Asian democratic adaptations
is the absence of a structured exit strategy for accomplished leaders. Sheikh
Hasina’s case illustrates this. After significant achievements, she might have
transitioned into a mentoring role while nurturing a credible succession chain.
A nation’s destiny must never become dependent on a single
individual.
What is at stake in Bangladesh extends beyond partisan
politics. The broader security and progress of the subcontinent depend
significantly on the ideological and governance choices Dhaka makes.
The preservation of a distinct civilizational identity of
South Asia rooted in harmony and coexistence among nations, beliefs, cultural
and linguistic identities require containing both extremist Islamist xenophobia
and reactive Hindu parochialism. India must absorb positive civilizational
strengths while filtering out elements that foster hate, stagnation, and
conflict.
These are ambitious goals. Building appropriate
institutional capacities to pursue these through strategic policies requires
courage, clarity, and long-term investments in statecraft.
I am hoping against hope that the recent developments in
Bangladesh triggers deeper and innovative strategic thinking among Indian
policymakers.
No comments:
Post a Comment