SHENZHEN TRI-LATERAL MEET: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
At a time when Trump–Xi–Putin trilateral in Shenzhen has gained global attention and strategists world over have marvelled at the super astute geopolitics of China, there is a feeble call from Tokyo by India and Japan for a multipolar world. It sounds hollow rhetoric cum ritual bereft of any sincerity of purpose. It evokes a sense of frustration and pain as an Indian, given our potential and capacity as a nation, especially our civilisational values and quality of a significant component of educated human resource.
It is a stark reminder of how badly India has not only missed the bus but demolished the bus stop itself from where a journey in the direction of great power, befitting its potential, was possible. Self-seeking clerical-broker cum Mansabdari values of our political-bureaucratic-corporate establishment and total poverty of sagacity and integrity of statecraft has not merely brought about this situation but exposes us to catastrophic vulnerabilities that legal-bureaucratic brains shall struggle to fathom. The emerging real power equations have potential to threaten us and the whole of Asia-Africa in ways that are far too worrying.
It is not about negotiations of the world’s decisive strategic bargains in a narrow great-power setting from which India is absent. It is more about the irrelevance of humanist civilisational values of India in larger institutional, psychological and environmental dynamics in an integrated world, and the resultant loss for humanity and the world that genuine sagely practitioners of statecraft need to worry about. Domination of the world by an America controlled by self-seeking narcissistic cabals, a China drifting from Deng Xiaoping-led political reforms and Russia with its own constraints is something more than a photo opportunity and public spectacle. I had posted on X a few days back that the summit demonstrates the centrality of China, exposes the limits of Trumpian bluffs and American hard power, strategic dependence of Russia on China, undermining its long-term civilisational resilience, and the near-total irrelevance of India.
Amongst serious thinkers of statecraft on India, if at all they exist, it should force an honest reckoning. The extraordinary geopolitical opportunity that India received after 9/11 was exceptional. But we have failed to convert it into durable national power and global influence largely due to the poverty of wisdom, ethic and courage of statecraft that we often speak of but lack the mental resilience, as a state, to pursue.
OPPORTUNITY AFTER SUSTAINED HOSTILITY OF WEST IN 20th CENTURY:
Hostility of Western imperial states, notwithstanding admiration of their society for our democracy, was an unmistakable reality of the previous century. It was ruthless geopolitics of American global domination that drove such an agenda. US-Pakistan-China nexus in this region was much talked about during our days in JNU. Many leftists mistakenly thought the solution was transition to the Chinese or Russian model of communism. Having been groomed by hardcore radical leftists, rightists and even centrist mentors—during my shifting journey in all three shades of student politics—I had believed even during those days that India needed to explore its own democratic and governance model of Indocracy. Over time, that belief has only further strengthened.
After the 9/11 attacks, the United States had appeared to drift towards India in search of reliable partners across Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the broader struggle against radical terrorism and opaque authoritarianism. There was a level of understanding that India needed a bit of space to manage ties with Russia and even nudge it towards more transparency. In geopolitics, nothing appears in black and white; one has to sense the opportunities and dynamics that are invisible and yet act in time. India needed to understand the unwritten invisible power dynamics regionally and globally as well as internally within the United States.
India was uniquely placed to become a central architect of the emerging regional order: it had democratic legitimacy, a professional military, intelligence experience, deep ties with Russia, historical links with Afghanistan and Iran, and growing economic capacity. What it lacked was vision, integrity, courage and sagely statesmen or stateswomen to translate this opportunity into capacity.
India could have built a comprehensive Eurasian strategy that combined hard and soft power. It could have deepened defence and intelligence cooperation with the United States, helped stabilise Afghanistan, expanded access to Central Asia, preserved its partnership with Russia, and used Iran as a bridge to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Eurasia. We failed, and very few people on the entire planet may have invested as much energy as I have tried to understand these dynamics by harnessing both my exposures and understanding. This is no immodesty but a sincere belief, even if misplaced.
TRAP OF DYNASTIC - IDENTITY BASED ENTITLEMENT: AS OPPOSED TO DYNAMIC AND RESILIENT INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
Instead, India succumbed to the greed of its elite, and their invisible cartels. The Indian state couldn’t break through the psyche of dynastic entitlement built over a millennium and a half. It failed to reform its systems and institutions to optimise its capacities as a state and nation. It couldn’t negotiate the complex web of invisible and unwritten dynamics of security and geopolitical equations domestically and internationally. It pursued a cautious, tentative, fragmented, and largely reactive approach. It failed to use the wisdom and resilience of statecraft to negotiate internal power equations with both the United States and China and even other friends, enemies, frenemies and neutrals.
We couldn’t entirely defy the flawed and super-expensive misadventures of the United States in Afghanistan by presenting a more robust and reliable alternative. We were probably too submissive and reactive. We lacked institutional innovation and capacity to contribute to a solution in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia to reshape geopolitical and regional equations. We had varying degrees of goodwill and pockets of influence in each.
Our strategies in Afghanistan and Central Asia appeared more tactical, myopic and ritualistic rather than dynamic and efficacious. Even if we may have some consolation over Pakistan-Afghanistan disputes, whereas, as a nation, we had the opportunity to wipe out the very psyche of Islamic radicalism and terrorism from the entire planet, and this was not by word but deployment of a variety of low-cost and sustainable instruments, strategies and capacities in collaboration with like-minded forces. We needed a powerful vision and an army of brilliant doers, leaders and thinkers in every sphere of state and society. We failed. It was not failure of one leader. It was failure of an entire ecosystem. Great states and civilisations falter not at flaws and follies attributable to one or two great leaders. It is collective failure of an entire generation that fails to throw up a few powerful ideas that can rally people for a common cause.
LONG LEGACY OF MANSABDARI PSYCHE AND PSYCHE OF HERO WORSHIP:
It is the perverse Mansabdari psyche and hero-worship culture that is responsible for the failure of our state to rise above human frailties of a few top men and women in positions of power, influence and authority.
A large state cannot run on the wisdom and folly of one or two minds and their faithful cronies. The larger problem was caste-like bureaucracy that fostered more of entitlement and corruption and less of excellence, innovation, dynamism, integrity and patriotism.
India’s failure was not a lack of potential. It was a failure of strategic imagination, institutional execution, and sustained follow-through. We have failed to reform our political, bureaucratic, judicial and education systems. I have written extensively on these. How we have allowed spirited cartels to use these institutions to thrive at the cost of the nation. The resounding mandate for PM Modi in 2014 was the last hope, but even that has been substantially destroyed. It is not an individual failure. It is collective failure of a nation.
SHENZHEN: LARGER IMPLICATIONS OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
Today we are staring at something that is seriously worrying. The recent trilateral summit at Shenzhen not only underlines the centrality of China in the global power dynamic but also the strategic dependence of Russia on China. With estimated resources of over 75 trillion, Russia is the most resource-rich nation on the planet. It has been reduced into a junior partner of China. The dynamics behind the Russia-Ukraine war and the very election of Trump to the Presidency are outcomes of those contradictions that American democracy could not remedy in time. Given the strategic psyche of China, its exceptional strengths in several spheres, alongside contradictions, the world shall more and more depend upon the Confucian mercy and discretion of CCP leadership. A world and order that rests on severe imbalance shall always be vulnerable to collapse and disruption and large-scale sufferings. This is the very dynamic of nature. It is strategic balance, and not a few claves or towers of power, within society and this universe, that drives all progress and advancement.
The most populous nation with a democratic political system, howsoever rigged and distorted, would have been the biggest stabilising force. But the last eight decades, and especially this century, mark a missed opportunity.
It was possible for India to emerge as a major security partner of the US while retaining strategic autonomy to push both Russia and Iran towards greater transparency and institutional resilience, provided it pursued the Kautilyan statecraft and not the Western clerical-trader model that derives its strength more due to accumulation of wealth over the last half a millennium through colonisation of the world.
But limited defence-industrial transformation, slower military modernisation, and insufficient regional presence are indicators of bad institutions.
India could have become the indispensable power linking the Indo-Pacific with Eurasia. Instead, it often allowed others to define the strategic vocabulary of the region while it struggled to convert goodwill into infrastructure, markets, institutions, and strategic leverage. Neither confrontation nor capitulation should have defined India’s approach to partnership with the USA. India should have better appreciated both the limits of American power and its internal contradictions to navigate the same. But its own institutional limits severely undermined and crippled its capacity to do so.
Russia and Iran are central to this missed opportunity. Russia is not merely a defence supplier or energy partner; it is a continental power whose independence from China matters directly to India’s security across Central Asia, the Arctic, the Indian Ocean, and Eurasia. India’s interest lies in helping Russia retain strategic balance, economic resilience, and geopolitical agency—not in abandoning it to a simplistic US-centric worldview. Russia needs to be strategically balanced and independent of China. The American strategic community may realise their folly after a few decades. Russia’s growing reliance on Beijing has not only narrowed India’s Eurasian room for manoeuvre but also inflicted a big setback for the strategic priorities of the United States.
Iran, likewise, must not be treated merely as a sanctions-driven problem. Its geography makes it a bridge between India, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Russia, and the Persian Gulf. Chabahar and the International North-South Transport Corridor can reduce India’s dependence on congested maritime routes and China-influenced supply chains.
India has to engage Iran firmly and without illusion: oppose terrorism and Islamic radicalism/obscurantism, but protect maritime freedom, and defend its own security interests. But it should also recognise that isolating Iran strengthens the forces that benefit from confrontation, radicalisation, and dependency. A stable, economically connected, and more open Iran serves Indian interests far better than a humiliated and hostile Iran.
India must contribute to shaping a stable, inclusive Afghan order. We contributed to reconstruction and humanitarian assistance but could not prevent the eventual return of Taliban influence. We surrendered our investment in Afghanistan. Today, the situation is tactically better in Afghanistan, more due to its own dynamics. I had predicted the ISI-Taliban fissure in mid-2021 itself at several platforms, including the one with my long-term friend Santosh Bharti at his Hindi platform. But long-term strategic concerns over the Taliban remain worrying.
We have tactically missed the opportunity in Central Asia. We could have fostered deeper partnership with Central Asia through collaboration in the realm of connectivity, energy, minerals, and security. China’s success is explained by its institutional capacities and domestic ecosystem. There is no corresponding structural and civilisational reform in India. We persisted with a debilitated colonial-Mansabdari system despite the enormous resilience of our humanistic civilisational values.
India can help Russia and Iran not by lecturing them in Western liberal language, but by demonstrating a superior alternative: a democracy that delivers, a state that is strong yet accountable, a society that is culturally confident yet plural, and a strategic culture that is independent rather than reactive. India’s influence will come not from moral sermons but from the visible success of its institutions, technology, economy, and diplomacy.
Russia needs a pathway away from militarised stagnation towards innovation, institutional resilience, and diversified power. Iran needs a pathway away from isolation and coercive rigidity towards a more productive and regionally responsible order. India cannot impose these outcomes, but it can create incentives, partnerships, and quiet channels that make such evolution strategically attractive.
PROLONGED DISRUPTION OF CULTURE OF STATECRAFT IN INDIA
The Indian State, following independence, never envisioned, encouraged or tolerated an Indocratic model of democratic, culturally rooted, effective governance or statecraft model. There were serious reforms and major initiatives after independence that led to steel mills, atomic and space capacities, green and white revolutions and finally economic liberalisation. These were good and yet inadequate given our size, challenges and aspirations as a state and civilisation.
The Shenzhen trilateral matters because it suggests that the US, China, and Russia may seek direct great-power accommodation on issues ranging from Ukraine and nuclear arms control to trade, technology, and Asian security. India has relationships with all three, but it does not yet possess the autonomous weight to ensure that its core interests cannot be overridden in their bargains.
Had India built deeper strategic capacity through serious leadership-driven reforms in institutions, it would have been much easier to build stronger regional security and collaboration frameworks, and a more confident Eurasian presence. We would have been less vulnerable to decisions made in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow without New Delhi at the table. But such aspirations cannot be translated into capacity by lofty speeches and rhetoric. There has to be a ruthless and dispassionate understanding of ourselves, the world and our own challenges, goals and priorities. This is easier said than done.
India must now rebuild the opportunity it lost—not by copying America, Russia, or China, but by becoming a distinct civilisational power. It should strengthen its partnership with the United States without becoming dependent on it; preserve its relationship with Russia without accepting Chinese tutelage; engage Iran without romanticising its regime; and compete with China without surrendering to fear or provocation.
INDOCRACY
India, despite its long civilisational history and the earliest culture of statecraft, has never consistently projected, following its independence, a compelling civilisational and institutional alternative. Rather, our political and academic class who boast of the Vishwaguru model have failed to rise beyond the trap of identity-based entitlement and perverse private greed. How can you identify with entire humanity and boast to present a model to them when you are unwilling to make even the remotest of private sacrifice?
This is where Indocracy becomes more than an intellectual idea. It is a framework of statecraft that seeks to combine universal humanist goals with scientific institutional capacities rooted in local realities, while optimising the synergy between individual and society, state and society, and man and nature. It aims to build innovation, institutional integrity, strategic leadership, and a governance model that is both effective and humane.
The Indocratic answer is neither isolation nor blind alignment. It is strategic autonomy with purpose: India must help Russia remain independent, help Iran find a route out of isolation, work with the United States where interests converge, and resist every attempt to turn India into a frontline state in someone else’s conflict.
The frustration for the originator of Indocracy is too deep and profound. India possesses the geography, talent, population, democratic experience, and civilisational depth to shape the world. Yet it has too often allowed reactive diplomacy, institutional weakness, and a reluctance to think in decades to reduce its potential. The Shenzhen meeting is not merely another summit; it is a warning that India must rediscover itself and rise beyond the clerical-trader moorings of its existing institutions that, by default, define our reactive approach to events. We have the capacity to rewrite history for the betterment of entire humanity, provided we can liberate ourselves from the greed, cowardice and poverty of courage and ethic of our stakeholders holding back our progress as a state and civilisation.
The decline of the Indian and Indo-Asian science of universalistic and humanistic statecraft, which is absent from the largely West-dominated intellectual literature, has caused sufferings for the entire human race. It has distorted the evolutionary course of human civilisation. The founding fathers of the nation, despite their constraints, had made an attempt in that direction. But we have lost the direction somewhere.
In the realm of statecraft, there is no point in lamenting the past. Sanatan and Hindu philosophy believe in renewal. Nothing ends permanently. We believe in the continuity of this universe. Every Tandav of Shiva that destroys the universe also sows seeds of regeneration. Even death is only a prelude to the rebirth of the soul. Let us hope Indocracy redawns in some genuinely sovereign part of the world where elites personify the integrity, courage, brilliance and innovation that defined our civilisational journey for several millennia before the dawn of Christianity and Islam.
Eternal Sanatan values teach us to spiritually and intellectually evolve ourselves to a level where we think and act as an integral spark of entire humanity or this very cosmos.
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4 comments:
India’s approach to West Asia is sensitive. Hence, the Government takes very guarded stand. Excellent analysis with future ready solutions.
Thanks. Being guarded is not only fine but great. We have goodwill across divides. Very few people can understand it better. We substantially surrendered our goodwill due to strategic poverty. The route to a robust diplomatic and geopolitical strategy lays not in statements and tactics but stronger institutional reforms. I find no justification for poverty of vision and ethic in this realm.
A detailed incisive analysis of India's diplomacy in a fast changing world. In the present context of Shengen trilateral, Jitendra rightly laments on our failed chances while clearly delianating the path we could have taken. My 2 comments are - first, during OP Sindoor no country backed us openly, while recognising our right to retaliate only as a general response. Secondly, to play a bigger role in the comity of nations, one needs to be internally strong, militarily, economically with social cohesion and which we ought to be as the largest democracy. And yes agree totally with the critical need for institutional reforms. Keep writing
Above comment by me Yashovardhan Azad
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