Innovative & Integrated Perspectives on Democracy, Governance, Geopolitics, Security and Leadership
Wednesday, August 26, 2020
My views on Pulwama terror attack at NewsX Panel Discussion
I have always maintained that terrorism is an act of war and not a law and order problem. To fight this war to win, we need stronger defensive capabilities at home and ability to pulverise enemy outside. Our previous generation was sleeping when Pakistan managed to acquire nuclear capacity by stealth. It is time we bolster our comprehensive national security infrastructure for a comprehensive victory and sustainable empowerment of India.
Tuesday, August 25, 2020
A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF INDIA
I have been extremely irregular with my blog and most other forms of writing in social media. This is largely due to my commitment to my primary research work captioned Quest for Indocracy.
I believe I must write on my blog at least once every week. I did try speaking on the page of Indocracy but I had to discontinue as the response did not appear adequate.
Meanwhile, I am posting a talk on National Security that I delivered a few weeks back. I have been advocating a strategic paradigm shift in our approach to secure our legitimate national security interests. I am sharing it for benefit of those who read this blog. Many people may have heard this talk on YouTube.
Thursday, July 2, 2020
BROAD CONTOURS OF INDOCRACY-II
It is universally known that states and societies that have advanced faster than others are those where formal-legal governance institutions, laws and rules have been backed by social values and norms. Coercion can never be a source of sustainable excellence in any field. That is what explains demise of authoritarian communism.
Indocracy proposes building optimal harmony goals of national empowerment and social values and habits of people. It seeks to work not only at the level of formal-legal institutions but also at the level of values and behaviour patterns of people.
Many of the existing social values, practices and traditions in India, and other developing nations, are obstructing a robust governance and security apparatus. These cannot be transformed overnight. But with a combined impact of legal and formal institutions as well as right role models and leadership initiatives, it is possible to bring about substantial transformation in these over the next few years. Indocracy has devised several detailed scientific principles and processes create that an energised leadership can use to build a broad consensus for time-bound comprehensive reforms in key sectors, brushing aside resistance from vested interests.
BROAD CONTOURS OF INDOCRACY-I
Both democracy and republicanism were critical ingredients of original political systems of Indo-Asia, with monarchy and absolutism being later day distortions, when the institutions were collapsing. Such a political system had driven the entire region to exceptional levels of all round material, scientific and social advancement. Its ability to foster individual excellence in different spheres, and harness these towards collective and comprehensive advancement people, constituted its biggest strength.
Indocracy envisions a scientific framework of governance values, goals, structures and processes that can optimise and enhance both individual and collective capacity and output of people in each context rather than creating a distributive arrangement after societies have attained certain level of prosperity. Indocracy is not about individuals fighting for themselves but about a social and political order that reconciles individual liberties and collective well-being in most judicious manner. Details of institutional structures and procedures need to be modified as per requirements and realities in each context.
Indocracy reasserts comprehensively composite cultural identity of India and Indo-Asia, where members of each identity and faith not merely co-exist and tolerate each other but respect and celebrate. It is a unique mix of Rigvedic values of Raja Bharat era, Kautilyan governance principles and the enlightenment era modern democracy, with Gandhian social values and principles.
It may not be possible to regulate the quality of political discourse through legal regulations alone. There shall be a need to revamp the structure of both criminal justice system as well as the structures and processes of political parties. A professional, leadership and output driven civil service shall have to be an integral component of an Indocratic political system. So will be dynamic and competitive corporate sector, driven more by enterprise and leadership and less by profit. Simultaneous restructuring of healthcare, education systems- both in content and deliver, institutions of higher learning and research, civil society groups and media enterprises shall be essential to build and sustain an Indocratic order.
I have repeatedly emphasised in my public talks that welfare state is a critical ingredient of national security and not an act of altruism or charity towards poor citizens. The challenge is not to simply feed people but to make them active partners of social and economic advancement of India. Their overall capacity must be stretched and harnessed towards strengthening the larger economic, social, technological capacity of state and society.
Under these, circumstances the idea of democracy must transition to the next higher stage before its too late. In their prevailing state, Democratic political systems appear far more vulnerable to subversion and manipulation by powerful internal and external cartels and vested interests, instead of pushing comprehensive and collective well-being of entire citizenry. Most democratic institutions, structures and processes are leading to sub-optimal advancement of people, state and societies. In many contexts, especially in the developing world, these breeding far too much of conflict, economic under-development and deficient governance, nullifying the advantages of open societies. Such vulnerability of democracy is particularly manifest in expanding asymmetry of all round power between a democratic India and authoritarian China, in favour of the latter.
Wednesday, July 1, 2020
WHAT INSPIRED INDOCRACY?
I have been using expression Indocracy to describe a more advanced form of democratic political and governance framework that can help transform India from a semi-developed country with modest public infrastructure and military capacity to a fairly prosperous, egalitarian, socially harmonious and cohesive country with far stronger militarily and security capacity. Indocracy envisions further refinement of democracy by resurrecting some of the original and ancient values of the Indian subcontinent. Following write up is reproduced from my page named Indoocracy:
( I )
I believed that the prevailing structures of Indian bureaucracy or even political parties and even criminal justice system were incapable of either regulating this competition or absorbing the shock. No one with a bit of sense, at least in my generation, had any doubts about the promise that such a move held for our future. The issue at stake was how to harness and optimise the dividends of economic liberation for the people and the country as a whole. After three decades of experience, my views have become more entrenched in this direction.
While competition is critical for excellence and optimal output in any sphere, it must be fair and well-regulated. An unregulated or deficiently regulation competition turns into conflict and retards excellence and output in any institution or society.
Existing mega elite could exploit their clout to rig the process of economic competition. Newer criminalised elements who were on the fringes of economy could capture centre-stage, as state would not be able to regulate competition. There could be much larger criminalisation of politics with steep increase in financial clout of such elements.
I had argued that we needed more specialised, competitive and autonomous civil service to support and regulate competition - both in politics and economy- and not obstruct democracy and development. We also needed more honest and efficient businessmen, which too was a rarity those days. People who aimed to prosper must contribute to society by providing services and generating jobs. All these would require newer norms, rules and and faster output of criminal-justice system to uphold these. Otherwise, resultant conflict and chaos could choke the entire productivity and output of people.
While complete equality is neither possible nor desirable in any system, some semblance of equality and universal access to economic security are indispensable for competitive economy and politics. These alone could optimise capacity and productivity of people in democracies.
I have harnessed my wide exposure, compared to most academics, to real life events and processes in geopolitics, governance, national security, and other spheres, to articulate a viable and pragmatic vision of transformation of democratic governance institutions and their processes in India and the developing world. These usher in far greater prosperity and security for people in the developing world. I have named it Indocracy. The discussion shall continue.
( II )
Once at his government house in Delhi, probably at Vishambhar Das Marg, he told me: “Beta tum naukri me aa gaye ho, lekin tumhare vichar nahi badle. Aise vicharon ke saath tumhein baahar aana padega nahi to tum baahar Kar diye jaoge. Lekin apne vicharon par tumhein swayam prayas karna hoga.Tum ek naye samaj ki Srijan ki baat Kar rahe Ho. Is ke liye apni Ahuti deni padti hai. Atm-bali hi samaj Srijan ka adhaar hai”.
Of course, there have been very very large number of people far more superior to me in intellect and commitment who have made far more serious sacrifices for the country. With all humility, I acknowledge that it is their contribution which has inspired me.
Post-independence India has been the only exception in the entire world, where democracy has thrived and flourished even under most adverse circumstances. This was not entirely due to our association with the West. It was more due to inherent strengths of Indian values. Indocracy is about scientifically refining the idea of Democracy to the next higher stage to bolster governance and national security capacity of a diverse and large country like India.
Since then Hon’ble Shri Mukherjee has been insistent that I meet him at regular intervals, whenever I was in Delhi or even while I was transiting through Delhi. Once his close relation, Shri Rabindranath Bhattacharya @ Mr Robin, a retired IPS officer, emphatically conveyed his appreciation when we ran into each other at Chandigarh in early 2014.
I had told Hon’ble Shri Mukherjee in July 2012 that the Indian democracy had reached a dead- end and we needed to chart out our own course with a set of comprehensive reforms in political parties, civil service, judiciary and entire criminal justice system, corporate sector, media, healthcare, education system and research institutions. These were outlined in my paper. (It will soon be published on this blog or a new blogs named: www.indocracy.org/www.indocracy.com).
The proposal form of Indocracy was devised following my haunting exposures to certain dimensions of serious subversion of India's governance institutions. I was convinced that it was impossible for India to optimally secure its legitimate national security objectives and goals, given the prevailing state of subversion of democratic institutions by both internal and external forces.
I was also convinced that if we were able to build some broad consensus on certain issues, India could reach an entirely different level and trajectory of all round advancement. My ideas, in all probability, were viable and yet too ambitious to be tolerated by vested interests who had got addicted to power. It was also not possible for me to carry out preliminary work on these as long as I was in service.
Hon'ble Shri Mukherjee, as the President of India, had a hectic schedule over the preceding few days when I met him on July 26, 2102. He promised to have a look at my ideas leisurely. It was merely an aspirational paper, which I intended to pursue only after exiting the government service. I had left Delhi next day and subsequently remained caught up in back breaking professional commitments.
Soon I started facing more concerted harassment from a section of clandestine elements in influential positions both in India and abroad. They were clearly afraid of my ideas in general and some were already angered over my diplomatic professional initiatives (and not intelligence as some media reports have attributed) that had exposed the vulgar underbelly of arms kickback, serious global crime, money laundering and their influence on Indian politics. I was convinced that Pakistan (and through them probably China) linked global crime syndicates had acquired considerable clout within the Indian establishments and sections of media and they were subverting and crippling us as a society and state. I had given it in writing to the concerned authorities and subsequently as well and some of these are part of court documents.
There is no way, any genuine or patriotic Indian could be nervous at the prospect of a persuasive campaign for well thought out governance reforms for a better and stronger India.
What my intellectual mentors, guides and associates in this journey, believed that it was not sufficient that India as the oldest civilisation of the world, just some how struggled to preserve a semblance of social harmony, amidst underlying fissures. It was more important that the idea of Western democracy was further evolved in to a strong futuristic vision and architecture of governance and stronger national security capacity.
We also needed to transform social order and larger values to optimise our cohesion, output and composite strength as a society and state. We needed something more effective than the mechanism of peaceful transfer of political power. We needed instruments and avenues to optimise our capacity and output as a state and society. Peaceful transfer of political power or coexistence of contentious identities were far too modest aspirations in a competitive world. These were likely to make us more vulnerable.
This would be possible only in a comprehensively secure, trust-centric, collaborative social order where individuals and families enjoy optimal harmony between them as well as with the outer world. This includes communities, societies, state and nature. Political institutions need to be geared towards fostering, and not fracturing, this harmony while retaining the freedom and liberties offered by the Western democracy.
Monday, June 15, 2020
INDOCRACY: INAUGURAL EDITION
This is first in the series of talks on Indocracy. Indocracy is not about going back to past but a futuristic vision of of a political governance system. There are lot of details about the context as I am hardly known among people. None of my accomplishments are in public domain. Hence, some effort has been made to connect with people by explaining who I am and where from I come from to talk about Indocracy.
Historical perspective is very essential but I am also not an admirer of the ideology of 'Hindutva'. Detailed and specific analysis of each and every dimension of Indocracy shall follow in subsequent editions. The talk is in Hindi. Effort is to reach out to most of Indians. But in future, I propose to upload a video every week in both languages. Duration of each shall be around 7-10 minutes.
https://youtu.be/KknHF8JF9Bc
Saturday, May 23, 2020
BORDER STAND-OFF: HANDLE THE CRISES BUT BUILD A STRATEGIC CAPACITY
[Crises like the ongoing stand-off on the border must be handled with all our existing resources. But we would peril security of India as a state and civilisation, if we fail to learn lessons from the past. We need to bolster our national security capacity to handle uniquely formidable challenges imposed on us by the sheer geopolitics of this region.]
ESCALATION OF TENSION ON BORDER
Sino-Indian
border has once again seen escalation of tension. Chinese troops have
transgressed into Indian side of the 'Line of Actual Control'. Displaying quintessential
Chinese duality, its media has been using a belligerent language despite words
of sanity by the top political leadership. Indian government has
approached the issue calmly. Indian Army Chief has visited his troops on
the ground and sent additional reinforcements. Indians have made it clear
that such transgression shall be rebuffed and status quo shall be
maintained.
Over the last few decades, Indian state has handled such conflicts deftly but
has avoided strategic preparation to deal with
recurrent aggression, brinkmanship and sustained territorial expansion by
China in the region. India's northern neighbour's internal governance
accomplishments, especially its economic transformation as well as advances in
scientific and technological innovation, are worthy of emulation. But its aspirations
for unrestrained territorial expansion and global domination threatens not only India but also
others in the region and even the entire world beyond a certain point.
What is worrying for India is the manner in which the Nepali Prime
Minister K P Oli has raked up a fictitious border dispute. He has jeopardised a
relationship of mutual trust as well as a longstanding social, cultural,
ethnic, and linguistic bond. Citing 1815 Sugauli treaty, Oli has
suddenly claimed an area that was never shown as Nepali territory even in Nepal's own map. He has not only pushed a legislation through parliament changing the map of the country but also whipped up nationalist passion by several strident anti-India statements.
Intriguingly, Kalapani area, on the West side of Kali
river, which Nepal has claimed, is located at a height of approximately
20,000 feet close to the tri-junction with the Chinese border. It
carries huge strategic importance in eventuality of a conventional
Sino-India conflict. Though the Chinese Foreign Ministry has distanced itself
from strident anti-Indianism of Oli but the plot is crystal clear to any
impartial observer. Other smaller South Asian states have so far remained
committed to the India's concerns but the Indian Government has to be
cognisant of the fact they are vulnerable to Chinese coercion and
enticement.
China's has generated border dispute with virtually each of its neighbours as a part of a
well-crafted Geo-strategic design, which appears continuation of the policy
of territorial expansion of Imperial China. It entrenches an oppressive regime internally and enhances clout of its incumbents globally. The
brazenness with which China has captured the South China Sea and converted it
into its own backyard is one of the multiple examples in this direction. As per most estimates, South China sea accounts for nearly 12 to 20
trillion dollar worth of marine resources besides being the second busiest sea
lane, accounting for nearly 50% of the world's commodity transportation
in terms of tonnage. Simultaneously, China's ambitious belt and road initiative
is nothing but yet another aggressive assertion of its global aspirations.
BACKGROUND OF SINO-INDIAN BORDER
Communist China has perennially criticized the
West for imposing a series of unequal and humiliating treaties on them for 100
years since 1842. But interestingly, it was Great Britain that was complicit to large-scale
Chinese territorial expansion for nearly a century from the beginning of 1800s. It
was imperial British that facilitated Chinese entrenchment in both Tibet and
Xinjiang or Eastern Turkistan, the two independent civilizations and states
that were culturally closer to India than Han China. Tibetans used Dvenagri script and Hindustani was a popular language even in Kashgar. The British were keen to
keep the Russians at bay over their ongoing rivalry with them in Europe and West Asia.
By 1840, the
entire undivided state of Jammu and Kashmir, including areas held by China and
Pakistan was already part of Sikh empire
under autonomous rule of Dogras. In 1841 Dogra troops led by Zorawar Singh had initially
captured most of West Tibet up to Mayum pass, garrisoned local forts and set up its own administration. It
were British who started complaining to Sikh emperor in Lahore against Zorawar Singh, accusing the legendary General of exacting taxes from British suzerains. There are unconfirmed inputs suggesting that some British officers were eyeing share of lucrative Pashmina trade between Tibet and Laddakh, which was disrupted by the new arrangement. Meanwhile, Tibetans marshalled fresh reinforcements and counter attacked Zorawar Singh's troops, taking them by surprise and killing the General, taking advantage of the inclement weather. They re-captured some of the areas and marched
up to Leh only to be comprehensively beaten and chased back. It was under these
circumstances that the two sides signed the Treaty of Chushul (1842), which acknowledged
Dogra-Sikh sovereignty up to Xydullah and East of Mansarovar Lake, way beyond the undivided territory of Jammu and Kashmir shown in map of 1947.
In 1865, when surveyor William Johnson demarcated Kashmir-Tibet boundary, he ceded significant territory back to the Tibetans on map citing inaccessibility from
Laddakh and hence difficulty to govern it effectively. Later this became Ardagh-Johnson
line when British Chief Military Intelligence officer Maj Gen John Ardagh proposed (1897) it as formal boundary between British
India and Tibet. As per this line, entire Karaksh valley and eastern side of
Chang Chenmo valley were part of Kashmir. What really transpired subsequently is still not
known, as there was no protest either from Tibetans or from nominees of Qing
ruler. But in 1899, a section of British officers cited Chinese reluctance to accept
the proposed line claiming that the Chinese had suddenly developed interest in
Aksai Chin at the Russian instigation. Others suggest that the British
kept hedging their position on Sino-Indian border depending on their equations
with the Russians in other theatres. Further, there was a change in status
of Tibet in 1912, when it signed a treaty with Qings to inherit all its
territories in Tibet and became an independent country once again.
Intriguingly, amidst Anglo-Russian rivalry, British objectives were dictated by
its own larger strategic calculations outside the region. Interests and
aspiration of indigenous people of Tibet and India were certainly not a
priority. Hence, when they brokered a deal during the famous Shimla convention
(1913-14), where McMahon line had emerged as the boundary between India and
Tibet, they still acceded nominal suzerainty over inner areas of Tibet, only in
deference to Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 which had demarcated the
respective spheres of influences of the two sides in Iran, Afghanistan and
Tibet. As per provisions of this agreement, the British were obliged to
enter into any negotiation with Tibet only in consultation with China.
Logically, this clause should have become defunct after independence of Tibet in
1912.
This was the time, when China was used both by the British and the Russians to
offset each other. Hence, even after Tibet had renounced its 192 years of
nominal suzerainty to the Chinese, and that too with the concurrence of Qing regime,
the British still invited representatives of the Chinese government to Shimla
convention in 1914, to demarcate boundaries among British India, Tibet and
China only in deference to Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. Shimla
convention acknowledged complete freedom of Lhasa regime in outer Tibet, that
shared a boundary with India, but nominal suzerainty to China in the inner
Tibet. Even such suzerainty barred any interference by the Peking or Beijing
government in day-to-day affairs of the Tibetan Government in Lhasa.
Though Chinese Government is believed to have reneged on the agreement reached
out in Shimla, largely at the instigation of Russians, it still had no
locus-standi to talk about the border between Tibet and British India, over
which it had lost even nominal sovereignty. However, there was no confusion even on the Chinese side about the exact border dividing India and Tibet. A map published by Peking University in 1928 had acknowledged Aksai-Chin and
large parts of other territories currently disputed by the China, as part of
India.
It is interesting that in 1950s, even Maoist China did not change imperial
outlook notwithstanding its proclamation of communism as state ideology. It not merely captured Tibet but also denounced Shimla convention on
the plea that Tibet was not an independent country in 1913-14 and hence had no right to
negotiate the boundary. Independent India's first generation of leaders being
freedom fighters, lacking any strategic exposure, acquiesced to the Chinese position, in deference to neighbourly bonhomie,ignoring Tibet's longstanding social and cultural
linkages with India as well as India's own strategic interests.
In 1950s, Chinese quietly built a road through Aksai Chin, nearly 100 kms
inside the Indian territory because that was the only route through which an
all-weather road could connect Tibet and Xinjiang. China went to war in
1962 with an an unprepared India that failed to acknowledge the Guerrilla
Commander in Mao, who had deftly secured his victories through an element of
surprise and deception, catching the adversary unguarded. Chinese occupied
nearly 39,000 sq km (approx) of territory and subsequently in 1963 Pakistan
ceded another 15000 sqkm (approx). Diplomat magazine reported in 2019 that
China had managed to acquire another 640 sq km of Indian territory by constantly
pushing the line of actual control. None of the two sides have confirmed
it though.
AN INSIGHT INTO CHINESE BRINKMANSHIP
It is
well known that the China has been disputing the entire McMahon line, claiming
large parts of Indian territory - where people speak Indian languages and follow Buddhist practices and have nothing common with Han China- as their own. Such an approach of China is not restricted to
India alone. It has been expanding its territory and domain of influence in all directions. It is nearly impossible, in the prevailing context, for the Chinese political leadership to appreciate Indian perspective, or respect any other power or civilization. This is especially given their habit of enjoying unrestrained access to absolute power and belief in infallibility of their own wisdom and innate superiority of Han race.
Even the Confucian morality, or the Confucian concept of harmony, that has become the guiding principle of Chinese state philosophy envisages eternal superiority and authority of the more powerful entity and obedience of the rest to it. The superior power, which in this case being the Chinese state, is restrained only by the moral principles, whereas the rest are expected to obey or at least not defy.
Communist China has consistently played up the gross historical wrongs inflicted by the Western powers on Han people. They also seem to perceive communist China's spectacular success as vindication of such a belief. While, they have been dealing with the west but their distrust towards the West and the Western ways has been more than obvious. India's perceived proximity to the West or its adoption of the so-called Western democratic model of governance has remained a permanent cause of their annoyance with India. They have also been discomforted with efforts to put India and China in the same bracket and have made conscious efforts to equate India with other minor powers in the region.
On the other hand, India has ignored the growing asymmetry of all round power with China for far too long. With five times economic strength
and significant edge in technological excellence and innovation, Chinese state may find it more tempting to exert pressure on India in retaliation to growing world-wide pressure over their concealment of Covid-19 spread.
ROAD TO FUTURE
While India should be able to ward off such
brinkmanship for the time being but there is no confusion that the world’s biggest democracy
requires serious restructuring of its governance institutions. India shall have to find an endurable solution to the irregular and diffused war with Pakistan. Conventional military techniques and surgical strikes may provide limited and temporary deterrents but these have appeared inadequate towards finding a permanent solution or obtaining a comprehensive victory.
Smart diplomacy and deft geopolitical manoeuvrings cannot substitute strong national security architecture with equally powerful strategies that need stronger comprehensive national power to sustain. We have to appreciate that only an economically powerful state, and not a large number of billionaires amidst an ocean of poverty, with high quality human resource, strong technological capacity, robust governance institutions and high level of social cohesion can sustain a powerful national security architecture.
Ironically, over the past few decades, far too many self-seeking cartels have become so powerful in India that they would be the first to obstruct, or even crush, any idea or initiative towards optimising the collective strengths and capacities of the country. All key stakeholders of India shall have to realise that the unique geopolitics of South Asia has saddled us with formidable national security challenges. As a large state, we have no liberty to comfortably ignore these to psychologically nestle under perceived protective ambit of some invisible or divine force.
Exigencies like the ongoing stand-off on the border must be handled with all our existing resources. But we would once again peril security of India as a state and civilisation, if we fail to learn lessons from the past. A strong national security capacity needs a powerful and yet a dynamic vision with a clear road map and commensurate efforts to pursue these. National Security in today's world cannot be a stand alone and isolated proposition. Institution of governance and society need to be increasingly harmonised, and not oppressed, for optimising their output and level of excellence.
[Crises like the ongoing stand-off on the border must be handled with all our existing resources. But we would peril security of India as a state and civilisation, if we fail to learn lessons from the past. We need to bolster our national security capacity to handle uniquely formidable challenges imposed on us by the sheer geopolitics of this region.]
ESCALATION OF TENSION ON BORDER
Sino-Indian border has once again seen escalation of tension. Chinese troops have transgressed into Indian side of the 'Line of Actual Control'. Displaying quintessential Chinese duality, its media has been using a belligerent language despite words of sanity by the top political leadership. Indian government has approached the issue calmly. Indian Army Chief has visited his troops on the ground and sent additional reinforcements. Indians have made it clear that such transgression shall be rebuffed and status quo shall be maintained.
Over the last few decades, Indian state has handled such conflicts deftly but has avoided strategic preparation to deal with recurrent aggression, brinkmanship and sustained territorial expansion by China in the region. India's northern neighbour's internal governance accomplishments, especially its economic transformation as well as advances in scientific and technological innovation, are worthy of emulation. But its aspirations for unrestrained territorial expansion and global domination threatens not only India but also others in the region and even the entire world beyond a certain point.
In 1865, when surveyor William Johnson demarcated Kashmir-Tibet boundary, he ceded significant territory back to the Tibetans on map citing inaccessibility from Laddakh and hence difficulty to govern it effectively. Later this became Ardagh-Johnson line when British Chief Military Intelligence officer Maj Gen John Ardagh proposed (1897) it as formal boundary between British India and Tibet. As per this line, entire Karaksh valley and eastern side of Chang Chenmo valley were part of Kashmir. What really transpired subsequently is still not known, as there was no protest either from Tibetans or from nominees of Qing ruler. But in 1899, a section of British officers cited Chinese reluctance to accept the proposed line claiming that the Chinese had suddenly developed interest in Aksai Chin at the Russian instigation. Others suggest that the British kept hedging their position on Sino-Indian border depending on their equations with the Russians in other theatres. Further, there was a change in status of Tibet in 1912, when it signed a treaty with Qings to inherit all its territories in Tibet and became an independent country once again.
Intriguingly, amidst Anglo-Russian rivalry, British objectives were dictated by its own larger strategic calculations outside the region. Interests and aspiration of indigenous people of Tibet and India were certainly not a priority. Hence, when they brokered a deal during the famous Shimla convention (1913-14), where McMahon line had emerged as the boundary between India and Tibet, they still acceded nominal suzerainty over inner areas of Tibet, only in deference to Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 which had demarcated the respective spheres of influences of the two sides in Iran, Afghanistan and Tibet. As per provisions of this agreement, the British were obliged to enter into any negotiation with Tibet only in consultation with China. Logically, this clause should have become defunct after independence of Tibet in 1912.
This was the time, when China was used both by the British and the Russians to offset each other. Hence, even after Tibet had renounced its 192 years of nominal suzerainty to the Chinese, and that too with the concurrence of Qing regime, the British still invited representatives of the Chinese government to Shimla convention in 1914, to demarcate boundaries among British India, Tibet and China only in deference to Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. Shimla convention acknowledged complete freedom of Lhasa regime in outer Tibet, that shared a boundary with India, but nominal suzerainty to China in the inner Tibet. Even such suzerainty barred any interference by the Peking or Beijing government in day-to-day affairs of the Tibetan Government in Lhasa.
Though Chinese Government is believed to have reneged on the agreement reached out in Shimla, largely at the instigation of Russians, it still had no locus-standi to talk about the border between Tibet and British India, over which it had lost even nominal sovereignty. However, there was no confusion even on the Chinese side about the exact border dividing India and Tibet. A map published by Peking University in 1928 had acknowledged Aksai-Chin and large parts of other territories currently disputed by the China, as part of India.
It is interesting that in 1950s, even Maoist China did not change imperial outlook notwithstanding its proclamation of communism as state ideology. It not merely captured Tibet but also denounced Shimla convention on the plea that Tibet was not an independent country in 1913-14 and hence had no right to negotiate the boundary. Independent India's first generation of leaders being freedom fighters, lacking any strategic exposure, acquiesced to the Chinese position, in deference to neighbourly bonhomie,ignoring Tibet's longstanding social and cultural linkages with India as well as India's own strategic interests.
In 1950s, Chinese quietly built a road through Aksai Chin, nearly 100 kms inside the Indian territory because that was the only route through which an all-weather road could connect Tibet and Xinjiang. China went to war in 1962 with an an unprepared India that failed to acknowledge the Guerrilla Commander in Mao, who had deftly secured his victories through an element of surprise and deception, catching the adversary unguarded. Chinese occupied nearly 39,000 sq km (approx) of territory and subsequently in 1963 Pakistan ceded another 15000 sqkm (approx). Diplomat magazine reported in 2019 that China had managed to acquire another 640 sq km of Indian territory by constantly pushing the line of actual control. None of the two sides have confirmed it though.
Even the Confucian morality, or the Confucian concept of harmony, that has become the guiding principle of Chinese state philosophy envisages eternal superiority and authority of the more powerful entity and obedience of the rest to it. The superior power, which in this case being the Chinese state, is restrained only by the moral principles, whereas the rest are expected to obey or at least not defy.
Communist China has consistently played up the gross historical wrongs inflicted by the Western powers on Han people. They also seem to perceive communist China's spectacular success as vindication of such a belief. While, they have been dealing with the west but their distrust towards the West and the Western ways has been more than obvious. India's perceived proximity to the West or its adoption of the so-called Western democratic model of governance has remained a permanent cause of their annoyance with India. They have also been discomforted with efforts to put India and China in the same bracket and have made conscious efforts to equate India with other minor powers in the region.
On the other hand, India has ignored the growing asymmetry of all round power with China for far too long. With five times economic strength and significant edge in technological excellence and innovation, Chinese state may find it more tempting to exert pressure on India in retaliation to growing world-wide pressure over their concealment of Covid-19 spread.
ROAD TO FUTURE
While India should be able to ward off such brinkmanship for the time being but there is no confusion that the world’s biggest democracy requires serious restructuring of its governance institutions. India shall have to find an endurable solution to the irregular and diffused war with Pakistan. Conventional military techniques and surgical strikes may provide limited and temporary deterrents but these have appeared inadequate towards finding a permanent solution or obtaining a comprehensive victory.
Smart diplomacy and deft geopolitical manoeuvrings cannot substitute strong national security architecture with equally powerful strategies that need stronger comprehensive national power to sustain. We have to appreciate that only an economically powerful state, and not a large number of billionaires amidst an ocean of poverty, with high quality human resource, strong technological capacity, robust governance institutions and high level of social cohesion can sustain a powerful national security architecture.
Ironically, over the past few decades, far too many self-seeking cartels have become so powerful in India that they would be the first to obstruct, or even crush, any idea or initiative towards optimising the collective strengths and capacities of the country. All key stakeholders of India shall have to realise that the unique geopolitics of South Asia has saddled us with formidable national security challenges. As a large state, we have no liberty to comfortably ignore these to psychologically nestle under perceived protective ambit of some invisible or divine force.
Exigencies like the ongoing stand-off on the border must be handled with all our existing resources. But we would once again peril security of India as a state and civilisation, if we fail to learn lessons from the past. A strong national security capacity needs a powerful and yet a dynamic vision with a clear road map and commensurate efforts to pursue these. National Security in today's world cannot be a stand alone and isolated proposition. Institution of governance and society need to be increasingly harmonised, and not oppressed, for optimising their output and level of excellence.
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